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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Defendants cannot avoid having to defend themselves against the allegations of
tortious conduct set forth in Stilwyn's Second Amended Complaint based on the doctrine of res
judicata. The district court dismissed Stilwyn's complaint, concluding that Stilwyn's
"involvement" as an intervenor in a prior declaratory judgment action in the Idaho Federal
District Court (the "Federal Case") barred the claims Stilwyn has asserted here. The district
court determined that Stilwyn should have made counterclaims and third-party claims there, even
though no claims were first made against Stilwyn. There is no rule of law that compelled
Stilwyn to assert counterclaims against non-existent claims or to bring claims against thirdparties in the Federal Case. Consistent with the plain language of I.R.C.P. 13(a), courts require a
claim by an "opposing party" to first be asserted against the prospective counterclaimant before
the filing of a counterclaim becomes compulsory. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata has no
application to bar Stilwyn's claims. Because the lower court's decision focused on Stilwyn's
involvement in the Federal Case, it is necessary to set forth the genesis of and procedural history,
decision, and judgment in that case. 1

Stilwyn refers the Court to its Statement of Undisputed Facts (R. Vol. II, p. 517-28) and the
Affidavit of B. Newal Squyres (R. Vol. III-IV, p. 536-1046) as the factual basis for the
statements made herein. These pleadings were filed with the district court in support of its
Memorandum in Opposition to IFB's Motion for Summary Judgment. No opposition was filed
to either pleading by IFB or the other Defendants.
1
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A.

THE FEDERAL CASE WAS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION BROUGHT BY
ANACONDA INVESTMENTS, LLC, AND PORTFOLIO FB-IDAHO, LLC, AGAINST
THE FDIC. STILWYN INTERVENED AS A DEFENDANT. No CLAIMS WERE MADE
AGAINST STILWYN OR BY STILWYN.

The plaintiffs in the Federal Case were Anaconda Investments, LLC, and Portfolio FBIdaho, LLC. The named defendant was the FDIC. R. Vol. II, p. 518-19; Vol. III, p. 555-60.
Anaconda and Portfolio sought a declaratory judgment that they, rather than the FDIC, owned a
58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan. Id That Loan became the property of the FDIC when the
First Bank ofldaho in Ketchum failed and was taken over by the FDIC in the Spring of 2009.

R. Vol. III, p. 580, iii! 10-11.
The FDIC thereafter put its 58% interest in the Loan up for purchase in a bank-only
auction. Id. There are very strict rules and requirements for participation in such an auction,
intended to prevent any person or entity other than a bank from participating, either directly or
indirectly, in the bid and acquiring an interest in the loan prior to closing. See R. Vol. III p. 57982, 759-62. In late September 2009, Idaho First Bank of McCall ("IFB") submitted the winning
bid in the bank-only auction. R. Vol. III, p. 557. Before submitting its bid, however, IFBthrough its president Greg Lovell (who had previously been the president of the failed Ketchum
bank)2 - had been working with a group of investors, led by Robert Kantor and Michael Page
from Ketchum, who wanted to acquire the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. III, p. 762-65. Three days
after submitting the bid, Mr. Kantor and Mr. Page, through their controlled legal entities, formed
Anaconda on October 2, 2009, "for the purpose of acquiring one loan from [IFB]." R. Vol. IV,

2

R. Vol. IV, p. 898, L 6-25.
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p. 1020, 1028. Shortly after being told it was the winning bidder, IFB agreed to sell its interest
in the Loan to newly-created Anaconda. See R. Vol. III, p. 737-40.
But, prior to closing its acquisition of the Loan from the FDIC, IFB got caught. R. Vol.
III, p. 659, ,i 12. The FDIC discovered IFB had violated the bank-only auction rules by virtue of
its dealings with Anaconda. Id. at 659-61. The FDIC refused to close on IFB's attempted
acquisition of the Loan, and the FDIC and IFB agreed to rescind the transaction. Id. at 660,

,i,i 14-15.
Nonetheless, IFB thereafter purported to assign its interest in the Stilwyn Loan to
Anaconda. Id. at 660, ,i 18. And Anaconda in turn purported to assign its interest to Portfolio.
Id. at 660-61, ,i 19; R. Vol. IV, p. 986. In February 2010, Portfolio filed of record in Blaine

County a Notice of Assignment and a lis pendens on the property securing the Loan. R. Vol. III,
p. 661, ,i 22. The FDIC protested and demanded that Portfolio remove the lis pendens and
release the assignment. Id. at 661, ,i 21.
Portfolio's response was to file, along with Anaconda, a declaratory judgment action in
state court seeking (1) a declaration that their acquisition of the Loan had closed and
(2) requiring the FDIC to transfer the documents necessary to vest title to the Loan in them.
R. Vol. III, p. 555-60. The declaratory judgment action was removed to federal court by the
FDIC based on the federal statutes involved and the existence of federal question jurisdiction.

Id at564-74.
After removal, Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on undisputed facts. R. Vol. II, p. 305-18; R. Vol. III, p. 591-93, 642-44. The FDIC's
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cross-motion was based on its counterclaim that Anaconda/Portfolio had violated a federal
statute by recording the assignment and lis pendens. R. Vol. III, p. 645-62. The FDIC did not
move for summary judgment on its second counterclaim for slander of title. Id.
On the eve of the hearing on the cross-motions, Stilwyn sought to intervene to file
briefing in support of the FDIC's opposition to the Anaconda/Portfolio motion. R. Vol. III,
p. 673-706. Over the objections of Anaconda/Portfolio based on the contention that Stilwyn had
no protectable interest in the rights to its Loan, the Court granted the motion. Id. at 717-24;
725-34. Stilwyn filed its opposition papers to Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for summary
judgment in late December 2010. Id. at 735-85.
Of particular significance here, the plaintiffs, Anaconda and Portfolio, did not amend
their complaint to assert claims for relief against Stilwyn. Given the limited nature of its
intervention, Stilwyn made no claims or asserted any causes of action against the plaintiffs or the
FDIC. Thus neither Anaconda/Portfolio nor Stilwyn made claims against each other in the
Federal Case.

B.

THE FEDERAL COURT GRANTED THE FDIC's MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, RULING THAT IFB (AND THUS ANACONDA AND PORTFOLIO) ACQUIRED
No RIGHTS OR INTEREST IN THE STILWYN LOAN-THEIR ATTEMPTED ASSIGNMENTS
FAILED.

After oral argument in late January, Judge Winmill issued the Court's Memorandum
Decision and Order on February 13, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 305-18. The Court found that the
IFB/FDIC transaction never closed because IFB, in its dealings with Anaconda, materially
breached the bank-only requirements of the auction. Therefore, IFB never obtained any rights or
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interest in the Stilwyn Loan. Id. at 315-16. Thus neither Anaconda nor Portfolio could derive,
obtain, or claim any interest in the Stilwyn Loan based on IFB's unlawful attempted assignment
to Anaconda. The Court held that IFB, Anaconda, and Portfolio had no right or interest in the
Stilwyn Loan. Id. It followed from this conclusion that IFB never had any rights in the Stilwyn
Loan to assign to Anaconda. And the FDIC thus had always retained its interest in the Loan.
The Court ruled that the subsequent attempt by Anaconda to assign its interest to Portfolio
violated the federal statute.
The Court granted the FDIC's motion for partial summary judgment. Id. at 316-18. The
only remaining issue in the Federal Case was the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim, which
was set for trial in late July 2011. R. Vol. IV, p. 829-34; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85.
C.

THE FEDERAL CASE WAS THEREAFTER DISMISSED BY AN AMENDED JUDGMENT BASED
ON A STIPULATION UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 4l(a) BY THE FDIC AND ANACONDA!
PORTFOLIO. STILWYN WAS NOT MADE A PARTY TO THE STIPULATION, AS NO CLAIMS
HAD BEEN MADE BY OR AGAINST IT. THE AMENDED JUDGMENT DOES NOT REFER TO
STILWYN.

Although Anaconda/Portfolio brought in new counsel (W. Marcus W. Nye) to work with
the Ludwig firm, the procedural posture of the case did not change. 3 R. Vol. IV, p. 803-05. That
is, Anaconda/Portfolio did not file claims against the FDIC or Stilwyn. And Stilwyn filed no
claims against Anaconda/Portfolio. Stilwyn later filed a motion seeking to participate as a party
in the upcoming trial on the FDIC's slander oftitle claim. Id. at 851-53. The motion was
vigorously opposed by Anaconda/Portfolio and was withdrawn. R. Vol. IV, p. 859-66, 867-69.
Stilwyn had no further involvement in the Federal Case. Thereafter, a Stipulation for Dismissal
3 No

other party joined or was joined in the Federal Case.
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pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(l) was entered into by the parties, Anaconda, Portfolio, and the
FDIC, to dismiss the Federal Case in its entirety. R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. The Court entered an
Amended Judgment based on the Stipulation. Id at 889-90. Stilwyn was not a signatory to the
Stipulation and was not listed on the caption or otherwise referenced in the Amended Judgment.
Id.; see also R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85.
The only claim litigated and fully adjudicated to conclusion in the Federal Case was the
claim for declaratory judgment made by Anaconda/Portfolio that they, and not the FDIC, owned
the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. IV, p. 889-90. That claim was decided based on the undisputed facts
before the Court on the Anaconda/Portfolio and FDIC motions for summary judgment.4 The
Federal Case concluded with no appeal.
II.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

Appellant Stilwyn, Inc. appeals from the district court's decision on summary judgment
that it is barred from bringing tort claims against the Defendants by virtue of its participation as
an intervenor in a prior declaratory judgment action, the Federal Case described above.
After the Federal Case was over, Stilwyn filed this case in the Fall of 2011 seeking
damages sustained based on the tortious conduct of a number of parties, only two of which were
parties to the Federal Case. R. Vol. I, p. 17-43. Stilwyn thereafter removed several individuals
from the scope of its allegations and filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on
4

IFB did not seek to intervene in the Federal Case to either explain or defend its conduct and
dealings with Anaconda that resulted in the Court's decision that IFB had violated the
requirements of the bank-only auction. R. Vol. II, p. 388, 111.
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March 20, 2012. Id. at 70-96. The various Defendants divided themselves into four groups and
with the exception of Mr. Kantor, who appeared prose, were represented by three law firms. 5
The Second Amended Complaint was answered by all the Defendants, with the exception of
those originally represented by Mr. Greener's firm and, as expected, denied virtually all of the
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 116-32, 133-36, 137-40. The facts
underlying Stilwyn's claims are therefore in dispute.
IFB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 9, 2013 on the grounds that
Stilwyn's claims were barred by the doctrine ofresjudicata. R. Vol. II, p. 381-83. The other
Defendants sat on the sidelines for almost a month. On April 5, 2013, Defendant Robert A.
Kantor and Defendants Rokan Corporation and Rokan Partners joined IFB's motion for
summary judgment. Id at 427-29, 430-39. The Page Defendants 6 then filed their notice of
joinder on April 9, 2013. Id. at 454-56. None of these joinder notices added anything of
substance to IFB' s briefing; they were simply tag-along motions, and there was no question that
IFB was manning the laboring oar and would take the lead at oral argument, which it did.
Stilwyn opposed the motions for summary judgment, arguing that its claims were not
compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case and were not barred by application of res

5

Prior to this appeal, the Greener firm filed notices that it represented all Defendants with the
exception of IFB.
6

At the time of filing the joinder, the "Page Defendants" included Michael Page, Michael
Edward Page Trust, Michael Page 2008 Revocable Trust, John Sofro, Bryan Furlong, Wali
Investments, David Wali, Anaconda Investments, Anaconda Managers, Portfolio FB-Idaho,
Rokan Property Services and Rokan Financial Services.
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judicata. 7 The Defendants filed reply memoranda. Id. at 1047-72, 1073-80, 1081-87. The
district court heard oral argument on June 18, 2013.
On this record, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision Granting Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 23, 2013. R. Vol. V, p. 1091-102. The court applied
the doctrine of res judicata, specifically, claim preclusion, to find that Stilwyn should have and
could have asserted all of its claims (counterclaims and third-party claims) in the Federal Case.
On September 12, 2013, the district court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of all
Defendants and dismissed the case in its entirety. Id. at 1133-35. Stilwyn timely filed its Notice
of Appeal on September 17, 2013. Id. at 1136-41.
The Defendants all requested an award of attorney fees and costs under LC.§§ 12-121
and 12-123. R. Vol. V, p. 1112-24, 1142-1200, 1201-73, 1277-86. On December 2, 2013 (filed
December 26, 2013), the district court entered its Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Costs
and Attorney's Fees. Id. at 1296-1304. In its discretion, the district court denied the Defendants'
motions for attorney fees, but granted an award of costs in the amount of $61.00 to the Page
Defendants and $58.00 to IFB. Id. at 1303.

B.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON APPEAL.

There is nothing from the Federal Case to justify the district court's decision that res
judicata precludes the tort claims made in this case. 8 The district court failed to appreciate the

7

Stilwyn's opposition papers to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment are found at
Vol. II, p. 457 through Vol. IV, p. 1046 of the Clerk's Record on Appeal. Stilwyn's
Memorandum in Opposition to IFB's motion for summary judgment is found at Vol. II, p. 461500.
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relationship and authoritative significance ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) to the
application of res judicata. Because no claims were made against it by Anaconda/Portfolio, there
was no "opposing party" with a claim against Stilwyn that it was required to counter by the
compulsory counterclaim provisions of Rule 13(a).9 Courts uniformly apply Rule 13(a) as it
reads to require a claim by an opposing party against the prospective counterclaimant in the first
instance. In addition, based on this Court's decisions in Joseph v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 962, 965,
472 P.2d 328,331 (1970) and Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120122, 219 P.3d 440, 445-446 (2009) reh 'g denied, the district court's decision should be reversed
so that Stilwyn may have its day in court.
Joseph v. Darrar held that res judicata does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims

and only actions properly classified as Rule 13(a) counterclaims are barred by a failure to raise
them in an earlier action. Moreover, the analysis of both the majority and the dissenting opinions
in Kootenai Electric lead to the conclusion that the district court must be reversed. Stilwyn was
not required to plead a compulsory counterclaim against nonexistent claims under Rule 13(a).
And, even assuming Stilwyn could have pursued a permissive counterclaim absent an opposing

8

"The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel)." Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 PJd 613,
617 (2007); see Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Stilwyn will
use the term res judicata as synonymous with claim preclusion. Collateral estoppel (or issue
preclusion) is not involved in this case.
9

The permissive provisions of Rule 13(b) likewise require the existence of an opposing party
who has made claims against the potential counterclaimant.
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party that had made claims against it, Stilwyn did not make a permissive counterclaim that it
brought and pursued to a conclusion.
Following this Court's prior precedent and applying Rule 13(a), the Court can resolve
this case without the need to delve further into res judicata and each of its elements - same
parties, same claims, and a final judgment. Even so, none of the elements of claim preclusion
apply here. IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants 10 were not parties to the Federal Case. They
have no basis to use that case and res judicata as a shield to avoid defending themselves on the
merits for the wrongful conduct alleged in the Second Amended Complaint. There is no rule of
law compelling Stilwyn to assert claims against non-parties.
Moreover, the same claim element is lacking. Stilwyn did not have any claims pied
against it, and it was not compelled to plead counterclaims. And finally, the Amended Judgment
entered in the Federal Case does not purport to cover or relate to the claims being made by
Stilwyn here. On its face, the Amended Judgment applies only to the claims adjudicated by the
federal court's Memorandum Decision and Order on the cross-motions for summary judgment
and to "the only claim remaining in the case" - the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim. R. Vol.
IV, p. 889-90. Anaconda/Portfolio did not make Stilwyn a party to the Stipulation for Dismissal
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(l). R. Vol. IV, p. 882-85. Having made that choice-the appropriate
one under the facts and circumstances - they (and the non-party Defendants) cannot use the
10

The Rokan/Page Defendants are fully identified at paragraphs 5-11 and 14-21 of the Second
Amended Complaint. R. Vol. I, p. 71-75. Furthermore, paragraph 39 describes these parties as
being led by Robert Kantor and Michael Page, who used legal entities and created new legal
entities (including some of the named Defendants) to facilitate the wrongful conduct alleged in
the complaint. Other Defendants include investors in these various legal entities. Id at p. 78.
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Amended Judgment as a shield to this case. The Amended Judgment entered pursuant to the
Rule 4 l(a)(l) Stipulation cannot be effective for purposes of claim preclusion against an
intervenor who did not execute the stipulation. Stilwyn is not seeking to relitigate any issue
decided in the Federal Case or subject to the Amended Judgment. The district court misapplied
the law in concluding that the three res judicata elements were met.
Finally, this is an appropriate case for this Court to adopt the rule and reasoning from
Section 3 3 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments limiting the application of res judicata in
the context of a declaratory judgment action. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted Section 33 to
limit claim preclusion to only those claims actually litigated and decided in a case where the first
suit was for declaratory judgment.
Stilwyn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of summary
judgment and remand the case for trial.

III.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in its

interpretation, construction, and application of I.R.C.P. 13(a), and its conclusion that Stilwyn
was required to assert compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims in the Federal Case?
2.

Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in its

interpretation, construction, and application of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) and
its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by reason of Stilwyn's involvement in the
Federal Case?
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3.

Did the district court commit reversible error as a matter of law in failing to adopt

and apply the declaratory judgment exception found in Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 33
to the facts of this case?

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over the question whether an action is barred by res
judicata. Kootenai Electric, 148 Idaho at 120, 219 P .3d at 444. And the burden to establish res
judicata was on IFB and the other Defendants who joined its motion. Id. "When reviewing a
district court's grant of summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard a district court
uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion." C. Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559,
561, 181 P.3d 485,487 (2008). The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to
show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court must "liberally construe ... the
record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draw ... all reasonable inferences and
conclusions in that party's favor. Liberty Nw. Ins. Co. v. Spudnik Equip. Co., LLC, 155 Idaho
730,733,316 P.3d 646,649 (2013) citing Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61
P.3d 606,608 (2002). Thus, all facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. C. Systems, 145 Idaho at 561, 181 P.3d at 487.
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V.
A.

ARGUMENT

STILWYN WAS NOT REQUIRED BY RULE 13 TO PLEAD COUNTERCLAIMS
AGAINST ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO OR TO BRING THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS
AGAINST NON-PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL CASE. THE DISTRICT COURT
THEREFORE ERRED IN DISMISSING STILWYN'S CLAIMS BASED ON RES
JUDICATA.

The district court granted summary judgment to IFB and the other Defendants, saying
that claim preclusion bars Stilwyn from bringing claims that "could have and should have" been
raised in the Federal Case. Stilwyn's "involvement" as an intervenor-defendant in the Federal
Case declaratory judgment action did not compel Stilwyn to make counterclaims and third-party
claims as a matter of law on the undisputed facts here. The district court reasoned that simply by
joining the Federal Case as an intervenor, Stilwyn was required not only to make counterclaims
against the plaintiffs - Anaconda and Portfolio - but to also join and make claims against all of
the Defendants here - including IFB and other non-parties to the Federal Case. Such an
expansive use of res judicata to protect these parties from having to defend this case on the
merits finds no support in the law interpreting Rule 13 or applying res judicata in the context of
counterclaims. Stilwyn was not required to plead counterclaims in the Federal Case unless
Anaconda/Portfolio had first asserted claims against it. Absent such claims, there is no
"opposing party" making claims against Stilwyn for it to counter.
The following statements illustrate the district court's misreading of Rule 13, the doctrine
of claim preclusion, and how Stilwyn's intervention in the Federal Case relates to the legal
analysis:
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•

"[T]he fact that [Stilwyn] never actually litigated its claims is irrelevant. The
question of claim preclusion turns on whether the claims could have and should
have been raised." R. Vol. V, p. 1098.

•

"[A]ll of [Stilwyn's] claims against Defendants should have been raised in the
Federal Case. Clearly they could have been." Id.

•

"[Stilwyn's] arguments to the contrary are well-crafted, but to rule for the Plaintiff
would eviscerate the purposes of claim preclusion; the Federal Case was an
available and appropriate forum for the resolution of all the issues in the case."

Id.
•

"Stilwyn entered the case as a party as a matter of right. It had the same
opportunity to bring claims as the other parties." R. Vol. V, p. 1099.

•

"Stilwyn chose to join the fray in the Federal Case and must live with the
consequences." Id.

Notably absent from these statements is any reference to I.R.C.P. 13. The district court's
application of claim preclusion was premised on the mistaken conclusion that once Stilwyn
joined the Federal Case as an intervenor, it was compelled to assert counterclaims and third-party
claims. That conclusion would be valid only if Stilwyn had a claim made against it. If so, the
existence of an "opposing party" then compels the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a), allows a permissive counterclaim under 13(b), or provides a basis to seek leave of
court to file a permissive claim against third parties under Rule 14.
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Without analysis or authority, the district court rejected Stilwyn's position (and the
universal authority supporting it) that there were no claims Stilwyn was required to counter with
a compulsory counterclaim. The court made no attempt to identify any claim for relief made
against Stilwyn that would compel the assertion of a counterclaim. Nor did the court cite any
authority for the proposition that a party, much less an intervenor in a declaratory judgment
action with no claims made against it, is required to file third-party claims.
The. "opportunity" to plead a counterclaim or seek leave to file a third-party claim does
not equate to a res judicata bar against a party for not doing so. It is unclear whether the court
used the words "should have" as its view oflegal policy or as a synonym for "must have." If the
former, that is, a policy decision, the court has misapplied the law. Under the facts here, res
judicata is not that broad a doctrine. The court failed to follow Idaho law that the assertion of a
counterclaim is governed by Rule 13, not res judicata. It is true that if a party must plead a
"compulsory" counterclaim it will be later barred (not by res judicata but by Rule 13(a)) from
doing so. What a party "could have" done, however, is not a bar to the later assertion of claims,
such as permissive counterclaims, that were not required to be pled as counterclaims under
Rule 13(a). 11
This illustrates another flaw in the district court's failure to consider the impact of
Rule 13. Anaconda/Portfolio had a solid basis to blunt an effort by Stilwyn to expand the

Stilwyn recognizes that the Kootenai Electric case supports the proposition that in certain
circumstances when a party fully pursues to conclusion some, but not all, of its permissive
claims, it will be barred from asserting other claims it could have raised in subsequent litigation.
These are not the facts here, however, and this is not the law applicable to this case.
11
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Federal Case. Anaconda/Portfolio could have said (and rightfully so)-we have made no claims
against Stilwyn and thus no "counterclaim" can be made against us. There is no reason to
believe or assume Anaconda/Portfolio would have made the decision to allow its simple,
straightforward declaratory judgment action to explode into a case where it was litigating its
liability in tort to the intervenor Stilwyn. Anaconda/Portfolio or a party in a similar factual and
procedural setting without claims against the prospective counterclaimant could successfully use
Rule 13 to avoid having to litigate counterclaims in its case. The district court's conclusion that
res judicata now bars Stilwyn's claims because Stilwyn could have, should have, and had the
opportunity to litigate all of its claims in the Federal Case is not supported by the facts or the
law.
B.

BECAUSE ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO ASSERTED NO CLAIMS AGAINST STILWYN IN
THEIR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, ANACONDA/PORTFOLIO WERE NOT
AN "OPPOSING PARTY" UNDER RULE 13 AGAINST WHOM STILWYN WAS
COMPELLED TO ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS.

The district court appeared to recognize the significance of Rule 13(a). It began the
"Discussion and Analysis" in its Memorandum Decision quoting the Rule and acknowledging
Stilwyn's argument that under the Rule it was not required to assert a claim in the Federal Case.
R. Vol. V, p. 1095; R. Vol. II, p. 469-73. However, without any discussion, analysis, or citation
to authority, the district court summarily disposed of the Rule 13 analysis by stating "[Stilwyn]
should have raised claims and arguably did, and are barred from raising claims here." R. Vol. V,
p. 1095. Having reached this conclusion, the court was then free to move on and rule that
Stilwyn's claims in this case were barred by the res judicata effect of the Federal Case.
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Although there are any number of flaws with the district court's analysis, its failure to
properly apply Rule 13 is dispositive of this appeal and requires that its decision be reversed.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides as follows:
Rule 13(a). Compulsory Counterclaims.
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the
time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim ....
I.R.C.P. 13(a) (emphasis added). 12
The district court side-stepped the Rule 13(a) analysis in one sentence, concluding that
Stilwyn should have raised claims in the Federal Case. R. Vol. V, p. 1095. The court's
conclusion overlooks the plain language of Rule 13(a) that a pleader shall state as a counterclaim
any claim against an "opposing party." It is undisputed that Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory
judgment action did not plead a claim against Stilwyn. R. Vol. III, p. 355-60. Indeed,
Anaconda/Portfolio opposed Stilwyn's motion to intervene on the basis that Stilwyn had no
rights in the loan that was the subject of the declaratory judgment action. R. Vol. III, p. 717-24.
It is likewise undisputed that Stilwyn did not plead a claim for relief against Anaconda/Portfolio.
Id. at 673-716.

12

Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is identical in substance to I.R.C.P.
13(a) provides that a pleader must assert as a compulsory counterclaim "any claim that- at the
time of its service - the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (A) arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; and (B) does
not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 13(a)(l).
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The precise question presented, therefore, is whether Anaconda/Portfolio was an
"opposing party" against whom Stilwyn was required to plead a counterclaim, even though
Anaconda/Portfolio did not ever assert a claim for relief against Stilwyn. This issue has not been
expressly considered on similar facts by the Idaho courts. The dissenting opinion in Kootenai
Electric does address the issue in a little different factual context, and its reasoning fully supports

applying Rule 13(a) as Stilwyn argues here. And the majority opinion in Kootenai Electric
likewise supports the conclusion that on the facts here Stilwyn was not required to pursue its
claims in the Federal Case.
Other jurisdictions have directly addressed the issue and readily concluded that Rule
13(a) means what it says - an opposing party is one who has asserted a claim against the
potential counterclaimant - and the existence of a counterclaim presupposes the existence of a
claim against the party required to make the counterclaim. 13 Stilwyn is not aware of authority to
the contrary. And neither the district court nor the parties cited authority for a contrary
proposition in the proceedings below.
Courts called upon to interpret Rule 13(a) have consistently held that the Rule 13(a)
"opposing party" must have first asserted claims against the putative counterclaimant. In Noel v.

Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), for example, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Washington's

13

Idaho courts may look to federal law in interpreting similar or identical rules of civil
procedure. See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,398,247 P.3d 620,
625 (2010) (federal case law provides persuasive authority when interpreting rules under the
I.R.C.P. that are substantially similar to rules under the Fed. R. Civ. P.); see also Black v.
Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 Idaho 511,515, 81 P.3d 416,420 (2003); Scott v. Agric. Products
Corp., 102 Idaho 147,149,627 P.2d 326,328 (1981).
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identical version ofldaho Rule 13(a) to conclude that an "opposing party" is one who first
asserted a claim against the prospective counterclaimant. Id. at 1170-71. The court quoted
Nancy's Prod., Inc. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 61 Wash.App. 645, 811 P.2d 250,254 (1991) in which
the court states:
We hold that an opposing party for purposes of CR 13(a) is one
who asserts a claim against the prospective counter claimant in the
first instance.
Nancy's Prod., 811 P.2d at 253.
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. "It is self-evident that in order to have a
counterclaim, there must first be a claim against the party asserting the counterclaim." Kearney
v. A 'Hearn, 210 F.Supp. 10, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ajf'd 309 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1962); see Augustin
v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1216 (8th Cir. 1975) ("An opposing party is one who asserts a claim
against the prospective counterclaimant in the first instance."); United States v. Raefsky, 19
F.R.D. 355,356 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ("A counterclaim pre-supposes the existence of a claim against
the party filing the counterclaim.").
Having no claims made against it, it is impossible for Stilwyn to be required to make a
counterclaim to a non-existent claim. Pagnotti Enter., Inc. v. Beltrami, 787 F.Supp. 440,443
(M.D. Pa. 1992) ("[Third-party plaintiff] is not being sued by any of the parties to this litigation,
therefore it is impossible for it to file a claim to counter a non-existing claim."); see Black's Law
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Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining "counterclaim" as "[a] claim for relief asserted against an
opposing party after an original claim has been made"). 14
Supported by the foregoing authority, Stilwyn was not required to make (or attempt to
plead) counterclaims against Anaconda/Portfolio because they were not an "opposing party" who
had first made claims against Stilwyn. The district court's decision should be reversed. This
Court's decisions in Joseph v. Darrar, supra, and Kootenai Elec. Co-op. v. Lamar Corp., supra,
lead to the same conclusion - the district court committed reversible error by its conclusion that
Stilwyn' s claims here are barred by res judicata because they should have been made in the
Federal Case.
1.

The Res Judicata Doctrine is Inapplicable to the Litigation of
Counterclaims.

In Joseph v. Darrar, this Court held that the res judicata doctrine does not apply to the
litigation of counterclaims. 93 Idaho at 766, 472 P.2d at 332 ("It is our opinion that the res
judicata principle is inapplicable to the litigation of counterclaims. . . . Only actions on claims

14

Contrary to the district court's implication at oral argument that definitions contained in
Black's Law Dictionary are not useful to the interpretation of civil rules (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 31 L. 15 p. 34, L. 21), this Court has looked to Black's to define otherwise undefined terms when
construing statutes and rules of civil procedure. See Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 611, 301
P.3d 264,269 (2013) (looking to Black's definition of term "final" contained in Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 59); Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312-13, 109
P.3d 161, 166-67 (2005) (looking to Black's in construing statute); City of Idaho Falls v. Beco
Const. Co., Inc., 123 Idaho 516, 526, 850 P.2d 165, 175 (1993) (looking to Black's for definition
of term "writ of execution" contained in I.R.C.P. 69); Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho 689, 692, 800
P.2d 85, 88 (1990) (utilizing Black's definition of term "filing" contained in I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l);
State v. Calver, 155 Idaho 207,211, 307 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Ct. App. 2013) (utilizing Black's for
plain meaning of phrase not defined by statute). This supplemental authority was provided to the
district court prior to its summary judgment ruling. R. Vol. V, p. 1088-90.
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properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a) are
barred by the failure to raise them in the earlier action[.]")
Significantly, this Court rejected arguments that parallel the statements made by the
district court to support its decision. See discussion supra Part V .A. In Joseph, the defendant
argued that the plaintiffs claims were barred by "not only matters actually litigated and
determined but also as to every matter which might or should have been litigated in the first
suit." Joseph, 93 Idaho at 765, 472 P.2d at 331. Defendant also asserted that "since the court
had before it both parties involved in the present action, the claim asserted here might and should
have been raised and litigated in that case and that since it was not, it is now barred by res
judicata." Id This Court disagreed, however, stating the plaintiff had "misapplied the doctrine
of res judicata" because it does not apply to the litigation of counterclaims.
It is our opinion, however, that [defendant] has misapplied the
doctrine of res judicata. Although he correctly stated that rule as it
applies in certain instances, it is not applicable to the litigation of
counterclaims.

Id (citations omitted).
Directly contrary to the analysis of the district court, this Court stated: "[o]nly actions on
claims properly classified in an earlier action as compulsory counterclaims under I.R.C.P. 13(a)
are barred by a failure to raise them in the earlier action, and this is a bar arising not from the
concept ofresjudicata, but from I.R.C.P. 13 (a) itself." 93 Idaho at 766,472 P.2d at 332.
Although the counterclaims in Joseph were permissive because they did not arise out of the same
transaction which was the subject of the first action, the Court's reasoning and analysis control
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here. To determine whether claims that would have been counterclaims in the first case are
barred in a subsequent action, Idaho courts are governed by Rule 13.
The district court, however, failed to engage in any Rule 13(a) analysis. The district
court just jumped to the conclusion that Stilwyn "should have and could have" made claims in
the Federal Case. This is the same type of faulty reasoning rejected by the Joseph court. 15
This Court's decision in Kootenai Electric Co-op. v. Lamar, supra, is also instructive.
KEC and Lamar were original co-defendants in the underlying federal case. KEC cross-claimed
against Lamar seeking an apportionment of fault among all the parties. "The cross-claim did not
specifically mention [the Idaho High Voltage Act (HVA)]. [D]uring the course of the litigation,
KEC fleshed out its claims against Lamar, specifically asserting a claim under the HV A." 148
Idaho at 121,219 P.3d at 445. After the jury rendered a verdict and apportioned liability, KEC
moved for statutory indemnification against Lamar based on the HV A. The federal district court
refused to rule on the motion post-trial because KEC had not pled statutory indemnification
under the HVA in its cross-claim. Id. at 118,219 P.3d at 442.
KEC then filed a separate lawsuit in Idaho state court against Lamar for statutory
indemnification under the HV A. Lamar moved for summary judgment on the doctrine of res
judicata. The district court first analyzed the motion under Rule 13(g) (cross-claim against a coparty) and then applied res judicata. In granting summary judgment to Lamar, the district court

15

The district court does not even acknowledge this Court's decision in Joseph v. Darrar,
despite it being very explicitly relied upon by Stilwyn. R. Vol. II, p. 4 70-73.
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concluded that KEC could have and should have included the statutory indemnification claim
when it originally filed its cross-claim for apportionment. Id. at 119, 219 P .3d at 443.
On appeal, this Court affirmed. In a 3-2 decision the majority acknowledged that KEC
was not required to bring a permissive cross-claim. Once it did, however, and pursued its claims,
including its other HVA claims, to a conclusion, the Court reasoned that KEC could have and
should have raised the additional HVA claim. Id. at 121-122, 219 P.3d at 445-446. Both the
district court and the majority recognized the analytical interplay between Rule 13 and the
principles of res judicata. And this Court, in affirming the lower court, emphasized the facts in
the underlying case and KEC' s pursuit to conclusion of its opportunity to vindicate its rights
against Lamar. These facts and analysis lend no support to the district court's decision here.
The dissent drew a distinction between a permissive Rule 13(g) cross-claim and a Rule
13(a) compulsory counterclaim. The dissent reasoned that if Lamar had sued KEC, then KEC
would have been compelled to bring all claims it had against Lamar under Rule 13(a). Because
KEC only filed a permissive cross-claim under Rule 13(g), however, it was not required to bring
all claims it had against Lamar at that time. "Lamar had not sued KEC, so any claim by KEC
against Lamar was not an I.R.C.P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaim." Id. at 123,219 P.3d at 447.
The dissent thus decided that KEC was not an opposing party under Rule 13(a) and concluded,
therefore, that res judicata did not apply. This analysis provides persuasive authority under the
facts here for reversal.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions lead to the conclusion that the district court's
decision should be reversed. KEC sought affirmative relief by way of cross-claim against
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Lamar, thus becoming adverse and a plaintiff as between them. In this posture, and having
pursued its claims to a conclusion, KEC was obligated to have asserted its other claim or be
barred by operation of res judicata. The dissent took a narrower view, reasoning that KEC was
not barred from bringing a claim against Lamar because KEC was not an opposing party to
implicate the compulsory counterclaim requirements of Rule 13(a).
Here, Stilwyn did not seek affirmative relief in the Federal Case and Anaconda/Portfolio
sought no affirmative relief against Stilwyn so as to trigger a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a). Under the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent in Kootenai Electric,
therefore, the district court misapplied res judicata as a bar to the claims Stilwyn is making in
this case.

2.

Stilwyn's Motion to Confirm Status Did Not Alter the Procedural
Posture or Status Quo of the Federal Case and Thus Provides No
Basis for the District Court's Decision to Apply Res Judicata.

Following the federal court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the FDIC, the court
denied Anaconda/Portfolio's motion for reconsideration and granted the FDIC's motion to
enforce judgment requiring Anaconda/Portfolio to release the assignment filed in Blaine County.
R. Vol. IV, p. 826-28, 847-50. Stilwyn thereafter filed a motion styled "Motion to Confirm
Status as a Party· to Slander of Title Counterclaim" seeking to be a party in the upcoming trial on
the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim. R. Vol. IV, p. 851-53. The basis for the request was
that Stilwyn had participated in the litigation with respect to the FDIC's claim without objection.
Nonetheless, Stilwyn knew it had not pled a claim for relief or for damages, and sought a ruling
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that it be considered a "de facto party" for all purposes related to the FDIC's slander of title
claim. Id.
Anaconda/Portfolio "adamantly" opposed Stilwyn's motion. R. Vol. IV, p. 859-66.
They asserted, correctly, that Stilwyn had never filed a pleading asserting a counterclaim against
them for its (Stilwyn's) damages allegedly resulting from slander of title or had ever joined the
FDIC's claim. As Anaconda/Portfolio stressed, "the Answer filed by Stilwyn does not contain a
single counterclaim against Plaintiffs." Id. at 862 (emphasis in original). And they accurately
stated, based on Stilwyn's intervention notice, that, "Stilwyn's exclusive purpose in intervening
was to defend against the claims in the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint." Id. Stilwyn then
withdrew its motion, saying that it would not participate further in the case related to the FDIC's
slander of title counterclaim. Id. at 867-69.
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC subsequently agreed to resolve their dispute by a
Rule 41(a)(l) Stipulation for Dismissal of the FDIC's counterclaim. Stilwyn was not a party to
the Stipulation. Id. at 882-85. Based on the Stipulation, the Federal Case ended by an Amended
Judgment that dismissed the FDIC's counterclaim, the only remaining claim in the case after the
court's Memorandum Decision and Order on the cross-motion for summary judgment. Id. at
889-90.
Any reliance that the district court placed on the filing of the motion to confirm status
was misplaced. R. Vol. V, p. 1093-94. As the court noted, the motion was not ruled upon. Id.
The motion did not change the status quo or alter the relationship between Anaconda/Portfolio
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and Stilwyn. Anaconda/Portfolio was not ever an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule
13(a) against whom Stilwyn was compelled to file a counterclaim.

3.

Stilwyn Was Not Required by Any Rule of Law or Civil Procedure to
Bring Its Claims Against Non-Parties in the Federal Case.

The district court insisted that Stilwyn could have and should have brought its claims
against non-parties (IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants) in the Federal Case and that its failure
to do so resulted in a res judicata bar to such claims in this case. 16 There is no Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure or binding authority for the proposition that a "non-party" to a prior suit
qualifies as an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 13(a). The Ninth Circuit, in Noel v.
Hall, supra, concluded that "to interpret the term 'opposing party' in the context of the court

rules so as to include a nonparty with an adverse interest is a non sequitur." Id. 341 F.3d at
1170; citing Nancy's Prod., 811 P.2d at 253.
In Noel, the Ninth Circuit applied Washington's version of Rule 13(a) to decide whether
plaintiffs claims against two defendants, a husband and wife, were compulsory counterclaims
that the plaintiff was required to have raised in a prior state court case in which the plaintiff
(Noel) had been sued by the wife. The Ninth Circuit found that while the plaintiffs claims
against the wife were compulsory counterclaims the plaintiff was required to have raised in the
prior litigation (because the plaintiff had been sued by the wife), the plaintiffs claims against the
husband were not compulsory counterclaims. The claims were not barred, the court reasoned,

16

The district court's memorandum decision does not cite any rule which would compel Stilwyn
to make third-party claims.
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because the husband was not a party to the prior litigation and thus was not an "opposing party"
under Rule 13(a). Noel, 341 F.3d at 1170.
IFB and the Rokan/Page Defendants were not parties in the Federal Case, much less
"opposing parties" under Rule 13(a). The district court's ruling improperly imposes a
requirement that Stilwyn, as an intervenor with no claim made against it, had a mandatory
obligation to bring IFB and the other Defendants into the Federal Case by way of a third-party
complaint to prevent a res judicata bar to such claims. That is not the law.
Third-party claims are expressly permissive. See I.R.C.P. 13(h) ("may be made parties"),
I.R.C.P. 14 ("may cause to be served") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h), 14 (same; third-party claims
are expressly permissive, not compulsory); see also, Temperance Ins. Exch. v. Carver, 83 Idaho
487,491,365 P.2d 824, 826 (1961) (citation omitted) (the cross-pleadings allowed by I.R.C.P.
13(g) and 18(a) are permissive, not coercive). Stilwyn is not barred because it did not bring noncompulsory, permissive claims against these Defendants.
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT EXCEPTION TO
RES JUDICATA, AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT DOING So.

The Federal Case was a declaratory judgment action. The district court mischaracterized
the nature of the Federal Case in stating that the "action in federal court was not merely a
declaratory judgment or attachment case." R. Vol. V, p. 1099. The only issue decided on the
merits by the Federal Case was that the FDIC was the rightful holder of the 58% interest in the
Stilwyn loan. The FDIC's counterclaim for slander of title was not litigated to resolution and
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was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l) Stipulation. The Federal Case started and
ended as a declaratory judgment action.
Courts across the country routinely decline to apply the res judicata doctrine in a
subsequent lawsuit where the first suit was for declaratory judgment. The legal support is found
in Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 33, commonly referred to as the declaratory judgment
exception. Although Idaho courts have adopted several sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments when called upon to decide issues involving res judicata, 17 endorsement and
application of the declaratory judgment exception appears to be a matter of first impression.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33 provides:
A valid and final judgment in an action brought to declare rights or
other legal relations of the parties is conclusive in a subsequent
action between them as to matters declared, and, in accordance
with the rules of issue preclusion, as to any issues actually litigated
by them and determined in the action.
1 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 33 (1982); see also Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 196 (2nd Cir. 2010) (the preclusive effect of a declaratory
judgment action applies only to matters declared and to any issues actually litigated and
determined in the action); Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 512 F.3d 912,916 (7th

17

Idaho courts routinely look to the Restatement in analyzing claim and issue preclusion and cite
favorably to the Restatement. See, e.g., Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630,
633 (2008) (citing Section 24 of the Restatement in analyzing whether subsequent lawsuit
involved "same claim" for purposes of claim preclusion); Eastern Idaho Agric. Credit Ass 'n v.
Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 408, 987 P .2d 314, 320 (1999) (citing to Section 13 of the Restatement
in addressing the finality of judgments for issue preclusion); Gilbert v. State, 119 Idaho 684, 686,
809 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct. App. 1991) (court should look to relevant sections of Restatement
(Second) of Judgments for guidance in deciding questions of res judicata.").
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Cir. 2008) (res judicata does not apply when the only relief sought in the first suit is for
declaratory judgment); Harborside Refrigerated Services, Inc. v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368,372 (2nd
Cir. 1992) (preclusive effect of declaratory judgment is limited to subject matter of declaratory
relief sought); Cimasi v. Fenton, 838 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988) (res judicata attaches only to
precise issue presented and decided in the prior declaratory judgment action); Horn & Hardart
Co. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 843 F.2d 546,549 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S.

849 (1988) (courts limit the preclusive effect of a declaratory judgment action to the matters
declared, permitting a later action seeking injunctive relief on the same cause of action);
Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1983) (declaratory judgment only bars

relitigation of issues actually decided).
The only matter declared and actually decided in the Federal Case was the rightful holder
of the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan. That decision is conclusive as between the FDIC,
Anaconda/Portfolio, and Stilwyn. Stilwyn is not attempting to relitigate that issue.
This Court should follow the vast majority of other jurisdictions that have applied the
declaratory judgment exception. In Andrew Robinson Int'!, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547
F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2008), the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Massachusetts law,
canvassed the decisions in other jurisdictions regarding the declaratory judgment exception. The
First Circuit found that "the vast majority of states that have addressed this problem
unapologetically apply a special rule of claim preclusion, consistent with that of section 33 of the
Second Restatement in the declaratory judgment context." Id. at 56. The First Circuit's survey
found that the following jurisdictions had adopted the Restatement's rule of law: Alaska;
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California; Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Maryland; Missouri; New Hampshire; New Jersey;
New Mexico; Ohio; and Texas. Id at 56 (citations omitted).
Moreover, the court found that the following states used similar reasoning and adopted
essentially the same rule, but without mentioning the Restatement: Kentucky; Mississippi, North
Carolina; Oklahoma; South Carolina and Wisconsin. Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
In addition, the following federal courts, applying state law, have adopted the
Restatement's approach: Seventh Circuit (applying Wisconsin law); Second Circuit (both
federal and New York law recognize the declaratory judgment exception articulated in the
Restatement); Northern District of Ohio (applying Ohio law); Southern District of New York
(applying New York law). Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
And finally, the following federal courts have opined that federal common law embraces
the rule: Eleventh Circuit; Seventh Circuit; Fifth Circuit; District of Massachusetts; District of
Columbia; Western District of Washington; and District of Connecticut. Id. at 56 (citations
omitted).
The policy rationale behind the declaratory judgment exception is articulated in Andrew
Robinson. The court reasoned that the declaratory judgment mechanism (i.e., the prompt and
efficient use to declare the legal relationships of parties) is frustrated if parties are required to
bring all conceivable claims and counterclaims or risk having them later barred by the
application of resjudicata. Andrew Robinson, 547 F.3d at 58. Therefore, the court concluded
that public policy was furthered by the ready availability of a "no-strings-attached declaratory
remedy that is simpler, faster, and less nuclear than a suit for coercive relief." Id.
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That policy is furthered here. Anaconda/Portfolio sought a judicial determination of the
legal rights to the 58% interest in the Stilwyn Loan as against the FDIC. No other claims were
made and no other parties were included. Anaconda/Portfolio received a declaration of their
rights - not the decision they wanted, but they got it in less than a year from filing the action to
the entry of Amended Judgment without the burden of lengthy and expensive litigation. As
demonstrated above, Stilwyn is not precluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion from asserting
its claims here solely based on its "involvement" as an intervenor in the Federal Case. This case
provides an appropriate and timely opportunity for this Court to adopt Section 33 of the
Restatement and provide guidance to lower courts and litigants regarding application of res
judicata to declaratory judgment actions.

D.

IFB AND THE TAG-ALONG DEFENDANTS FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN TO
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF CLAIM PRECLUSION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.

"The burden of proof for res judicata is on the party asserting the affirmative defense and
it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence." Kootenai

Electric, 148 Idaho at 120,219 P.3d at 444, citing Ticor Title, 144 Idaho 124, 157 P.3d at 618.
The three requirements for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action are: (1) same parties; (2)
same claims; and (3) final judgment. Id. (citations omitted). The district court erred as a matter
oflaw in finding that IFB and the tag-along Defendants met their burden of proof to show same
parties, same claims, and final judgment.
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1.

IFB and the Other Defendant Do Not Receive any Preclusive Benefit
from Anaconda/Portfolio's Declaratory Judgment Action.

The district court erred in concluding that IFB was a privy to Anaconda and Portfolio for
purposes of claim preclusion. The district court accepted, on its face, the assertion that the
"contractual relationship between Anaconda and Idaho First resulted in IFB being in privity with
Anaconda." R. Vol. V, p. 1097. That statement is simply not true, and it was error for the
district court to accept it. There is no dispute that IFB was not a party to the Federal Case. IFB,
however, attempts to bootstrap an argument that it was in privity with Anaconda/Portfolio, and
therefore, "stands in the shoes of Anaconda and is the 'same party' for purposes of res judicata."
Id. at 1061. IFB distorted the record in arguing that 'the Court made this determination in the

Federal Case." Id.
What the federal court found was that IFB materially breached the terms and conditions
of the FDIC auction, that IFB was disqualified as a bidder or prospective purchaser, and that IFB
never obtained an interest in the Stilwyn Loan. R. Vol. II, p. 315-16. It further found that, as an
assignee of IFB, Anaconda stands in no better position than IFB. Id. at 313. The federal court
concluded that the purported assignment between IFB and Anaconda was invalid. Id at 316.
It is absurd for IFB to argue that it now gets the benefit of claim preclusion by way of
privity based on an invalid assignment and Anaconda's role in the Federal Case declaratory
judgment action. The federal court found that IFB was a wrongdoer and that its purported
assignment to Anaconda was invalidated by its own material breach of the auction rules. The
federal court held IFB had nothing to assign, and that Anaconda did not receive anything. Id
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The district court cited Ticor for the proposition that a privy is a person not a party to the
former action who derives his interest from one who was a party to it. R. Vol. V, p. 1096. IFB
did not derive any interest from Anaconda or Portfolio. And the federal court held that
Anaconda derived no interest from IFB. "Derive" is defined "to take, receive, or obtain
especially from a specific source." Merriam-Webster.com (July 3, 2014 ). IFB did not obtain,
take, or receive anything from Anaconda. And Anaconda did not obtain, take or receive
anything from IFB. IFB and Anaconda are not privies.
Whether this Court concludes that IFB and Anaconda enjoyed some form of privity is
immaterial to the Rule 13(a) analysis. IFB suffers from the same defect as Anaconda/Portfolio.
Neither it, nor any privy, ever made a claim against Stilwyn. Anaconda never made a claim
against Stilwyn. IFB cannot pretend that it did.

2.

Stilwyn Was Not Required to Assert Any Claim or Counterclaim in
the Federal Case. As a Result, the Doctrine of Res Judicata does not
Apply.

The second requirement for claim preclusion is same claims. The analysis and argument
articulated above fully sets forth the reasons why the claims asserted in Stilwyn's Second
Amended Complaint are not and were not compulsory counterclaims in the Federal Case. See
discussion supra Parts. V., A-B. The "same claim" requirement is not met.

3.

The Amended Judgment Entered in the Federal Case is Not a "Final
Judgment" for Purposes of Claim Preclusion Against Stilwyn.

One of the consequences of the district court's misapplying the compulsory counterclaim
and third-party claim rules resulted in the district court's failure to properly analyze the "final
judgment" requirement for claim preclusion. Having decided that Stilwyn "could have and
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should have" asserted compulsory counterclaims and third-party claims left the district court
with no choice but to conclude that the Amended Judgment "decided all issues brought or that
could have been brought based on the facts arising out [of] the Stilwyn Loan/FDIC transaction."
R. Vol. V, p. 1100. That conclusion may be true for Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, but it is
certainly not true for Stilwyn.
The district court misread Stilwyn's argument that the Amended Judgment was not
operative against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion. Stilwyn did not argue that the
Amended Judgment was defective or that the district court should alter or amend it. The district
court's suggestion that Stilwyn should have filed some sort of attack in the Federal Case or
appealed to the Ninth Circuit is misplaced. There was nothing to appeal. Stilwyn' s position
prevailed on the declaratory judgment issue. It was not a party to the Stipulation or adversely
affected by the Amended Judgment- and properly so on the record in the Federal Case. What
was there for Stilwyn to appeal from?
The following procedural history in the Federal Case shows how the Amended Judgment
is not effective against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion:
•

Anaconda/Portfolio brought a declaratory judgment action against the FDIC
seeking a judicial declaration as to the rightful holder of the 58% interest in the
Stilwyn Loan. The FDIC filed a counterclaim as to the ownership of the Loan
under a federal statute and included a claim for its own slander of title damages.
Stilwyn intervened, but did not assert any affirmative claims and no affirmative
claims were made against it.
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•

On cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Anaconda/Portfolio and the
FDIC, the federal court held that the FDIC was the rightful holder of the 58%
interest. It also held that Idaho First Bank never acquired any interest or right
from the FDIC. Thus, the purported assignment between IFB and Anaconda/
Portfolio failed as a matter of law and had no legal effect.

•

After the court's summary judgment decision, the only remaining claim was the
FD IC's slander of title claim. Stilwyn filed a motion to join in that claim as a
"defacto" party, but the motion was withdrawn without being ruled upon. Since
the matter was never subject to a ruling, Stilwyn's motion had no consequence in
the Federal Case.

•

The parties to the only remaining claim in the Federal Case-the slander of title
claim (FDIC and Anaconda/Portfolio) then stipulated to dismiss that claim
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(l). Consistent with their position that Stilwyn was not a
party to the FDIC's slander of title claim, Stilwyn was not involved in or a party
to the Stipulation for Dismissal. Excluding Stilwyn from the Stipulation was
entirely consistent with Stilwyn's status as an intervenor with no claims made by
it or against it. 18

18

Stilwyn did not sign the Stipulation for Dismissal. Although binding and effective against
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, the Amended Judgment is ineffective against Stilwyn for
purposes of claim preclusion. See e.g., Island Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, S.Ct.Civ. 20120050, 2012 WL 5499863, *7 (V.I. Nov. 7, 2012) (stipulation does not quality for treatment as a
unanimous document); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. US. Forest Serv., Civ.A.08-
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•

The Amended Judgment that resulted from the Stipulation for Dismissal
established that no one (including the Court) considered Stilwyn a party to the
dismissal of the FDIC's slander of title counterclaim.

The actual language of the Amended Judgment also shows that it is not effective as
against Stilwyn. The Amended Judgment states in its entirety:
The Court enters this Amended Judgment to clarify its earlier
Judgment. The Court indicated that the original Judgment was
entered in accordance with the Order issued concurrently therewith
(Dkt. 72). That Order was based on the Stipulation for
Dismissal (Dkt. 71), which set forth the parties' stipulation to
dismiss the one remaining claim in this case - FDIC-R's
slander of title counterclaim. However, the stipulation also
indicated that the parties acknowledged that the Court's
earlier Memorandum Decision and Order (Dkt. 41) had
already resolved all other claims among the parties.
Accordingly, this Amended Judgment is entered in accordance
with both the Order dismissing the slander of title claim (Dkt. 72)
and the Memorandum Decision and Order resolving all other
claims among the parties (Dkt. 41). Accordingly,
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that this case be dismissed in its entirety.
R. Vol. IV, p. 889-90 (emphasis added).
The Amended Judgment provides that the parties to the Stipulation - Anaconda/ Portfolio
and the FDIC - acknowledge that the Court's earlier Order had already resolved all other claims
among the parties (i.e., Anaconda/Portfolio and FDIC). It did not, however, adjudicate any claim

323ERIE, 2009 WL 1324154, *2 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2009) (dismissal is ineffective where
intervenor's signature not obtained).
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involving Stilwyn because Stilwyn was only an intervenor and had not made any claims or had
claims made against it.
By its terms, the Amended Judgment is not and cannot operate as a valid, final judgment
for purposes of claim preclusion against Stilwyn on its claims in this case. "For claim preclusion
to apply, the prior judgment must be a valid final judgment rendered on the merits." Andrus v.
Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 778, 186 P.3d 630,634 (2008). The Amended Judgment resolved the
merits of the declaratory judgment claims and, based on the Stipulation, resolved "the one
remaining claim in this case - FDIC-R's slander oftitle counterclaim." That's all it purports to
do and all it was intended to do. It does nothing more.
The Amended Judgment does nothing to adjudicate, address, or resolve any claims
Stilwyn has alleged here. Apart from the established rules of law regarding the litigation of
counterclaims, the Amended Judgment underscores, in perhaps the strongest terms possible, that
the Federal Case cannot be used to prevent Stilwyn from having its day in an Idaho state court.
Stilwyn is not seeking to relitigate any issue or claim from the Federal Case.
The Amended Judgment did not adjudicate any claims or compulsory counterclaims
involving Stilwyn and, therefore, does not operate for purposes of claim preclusion against
Stilwyn as a "valid final judgment."
E.

No PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF APPLYING RES
JUDICATA TO DENY STILWYN ITS DAY IN COURT.

Public policy compels that Stilwyn be given its day in court. There are no public policy
considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata impaired by allowing Stilwyn to litigate its
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claims against these Defendants. This Court has expressed three fundamental policy purposes
behind the application of res judicata: (1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute
resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the
burdens ofrepetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the
harassment ofrepetitive claims. Ticor Title, 144 Idaho 123, 157 P.3d at 613 (citations omitted).
None of the three policy purposes are implicated here. No one is litigating or attempting
to relitigate anything that was decided in the Federal Case. There cannot be inconsistent results.
Stilwyn's claims have not been alleged or previously litigated, so there is no threat of repetitious
litigation or harassment from repetitive claims. Stilwyn is entitled to its day in court.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Stilwyn respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of summary
judgment. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, Stilwyn did not have any legal duty or
obligation to assert claims in the Federal Case. Stilwyn did not have any compulsory
counterclaims because Anaconda/Portfolio was not an "opposing party." And Stilwyn was not
compelled to assert claims against non-parties. Moreover, this is an appropriate case to adopt
and apply the declaratory judgment exception of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
Finally, the elements of claim preclusion have not been met based on the Federal Case, and the
Amended Judgment is not operative against Stilwyn for purposes of claim preclusion. For these
reasons, the Court should reverse the summary judgment decision and remand this case for trial.
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